The New York Times headline was a model of restraint compared to much of the coverage of Sputnik 1. |
The
morning of October 5, 1957 Americans woke
up to news that shocked and frightened them. Late the previous evening—about 11:30
October 4 Eastern Standard Time—the Soviet Union successfully placed a man-made
object into earth orbit. Two objects,
actually—a shiny metal ball about 23 inches in diameter with four whip antennae weighing just over 180
pounds, and the protective rocket nose cone from which it had separated when it
reach orbital Space.
The
ball, Sputnik 1 was essentially a
simple radio transmitter encased in a polished aluminum-magnesium-titanium alloy heat shield made in two hemispheres bolted together and sealed with
an O-ring. Its four antennae broadcast simple repeated
beeps alternatingly on two broadcast bands that could easily be monitored across
the globe by HAM radio operators. An hour after launch, after determining that
it had completed one low earth elliptical
orbit Soviet authorities had announced their achievement and released
information on how radio transmissions could be monitored and how the artificial moon might be observed from
earth. Actually only the nose cone was
large enough to reflect enough light to be seen from earth by the unaided
eye. The transmitting satellite, however, could be observed
by telescope.
Sputnik
was launched from a remote base near Tyuratam
in the Kazakh SSR, the site for testing
of R-7 two stage rockets. In a final race against time, the launch facility
had been completed only weeks before the successful launch.
The
Soviets had determined to proceed with a project to launch an artificial satellite
in January of 1956 after learning that President
Eisenhower had announced plans to launch an American one during the much ballyhooed
International Geophysical Year (IGY) scheduled to last 18 months from
July 1, 1957, to December 31, 1958. What
they didn’t realize was that the American effort was lagging due to the
unreliability of the primary launch vehicle, the Navy’s Vanguard rocket.
The
project was divided into two parts—the development and construction of the satellite,
and the development of a reliable and powerful two stage rocket which would, not coincidentally, be suitably
adaptable for use in the creation of an Inter-Continental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) capable
of carrying and delivering a heavy nuclear
war head.
Work
on the creation of an ambitious satellite was divided between five
industrial/scientific ministries under the loose coordination of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Original specifications for an object
that would weigh between 2,000 and 3,000 pounds including a 700 lb. payload of scientific instruments and
experiments. It was to be able to
transmit data to ground stations. But
when the various ministries delivered their parts, they did not fit together
due to variations in specifications.
Worse, the heavy package proved to be more than the troubled R-7 rockets
could handle
From
May 15 to July 12 three attempts to launch an R-7 failed. A fourth attempt on August 21 was partially successful—the
head successful separated achieved orbital space but had to be destroyed upon
re-entering the atmosphere. A fifth test
had similar results. While this meant that the R-7 was not yet
ready for use as an ICBM, it was determined that it was capable of deploying a
light weight satellite.
Given
the problems with the two components, the launch date for Object D was pushed back
to April 1958 by which time glitches in the satellite itself and the launch
vehicle could be ironed out.
But
Soviet officials worried that the delay would allow the U.S. to reach space
first. They ordered the hasty
construction of a stripped bare satellite with greatly decreased weight. The only real pay load was the radio
transmitter, critical in proving to the world that the Soviet Union got there
first.
The
Council of Ministers approved a plan
to develop the basic devise in February.
Two were ordered. The first was
delivered to the launch site in late September, just as the R-7 rocket was
deemed reliable for launch. Within days
it was in orbit. The second Sputnik was successfully
launched in December after the spectacular explosion of America’s Vanguard 1 on the launch pad.
In
Washington President Eisenhower took
the news with his usual calm equability.
Intelligence over flights in high flying U-2 spy aircraft had provided photos of the launch complex and the
Soviet defense establishment had even quietly announced the development—prematurely
as it turned out—of an operational ICBM after the first semi-successful test of
the R-7.
In
one critical way, he was relieved that the Soviets had got their satellite up
first—it was a potential slice through a Gordian
Knot of international law. The Soviets
were voraciously complaining about over flight of American high altitude balloons
exploring the edge of space violated their air rights. He wasn’t sure if the Russians had yet detected the U-2 flights at near the same
altitude. The U.S. wanted to argue that
space was beyond air rights, that it was international and free to any
nation. Since Sputnik would fly over the
US, Eisenhower was confident he could use that a president for the American
position.
The
President was also confident that the impending launch of Vanguard I would
surpass the Soviet achievement.
Ike
was shocked by the hysterical, almost panicky response from the press and public alike who were soon joined by swarms of Congressmen and Senators demanding
to know how America had lost a Space
Race it didn’t even realize we were in.
America
of the 1950’s was awash in two things—paranoia about the Soviet Union and Godless Communism and a fascination with
space travel that seemed nearly at hand.
America’s good Germans led by
former Nazi V-2 developer Werner Von Braun were assumed to be
better than the bad German scientists that the Soviets had dragged into
Russia. Von Braun was a ubiquitous television personality, collaborating
with Walt Disney on elaborate
animations of a future space station and
trips to the Moon and beyond.
Science fiction
films
and the lurid covers of paperback novels
and pulp magazines were filled
with sleek space ships, all somehow resembling huge versions of Von Braun’s
V-2. The dawn of an American space age seemed inevitable and a
hand. If they thought at all about a
Soviet space program it was with the assurance that their science and
technology were primitive, years behind the US.
No
here the Ruskies were, flying high
over our very heads with who knows what intentions. If they could put up a satellite, could they
bombard the states with nukes from space, or zap us with death rays.”
In
response to the uproar Eisenhower went on TV to reassure the public that the US
would soon be back in the game. He
ordered the launch of the Vanguard I moved up.
That launch failed on national television on December 6.
Meanwhile
the Army Ballistic Missile Agency was ordered to hastily revive scrapped plans for a
launch vehicle and stripped down satellite similar to Sputnik. The 38 lb. satellite was successfully
launched on January 31, 1958—a least within the promised IGY window.
Sputnik
1 had burned up upon re-entering the atmosphere on January 4 after completing
1400 orbits. Its radio transmitter had
emitted those beeps for 22 days, long after the expected failure of the
battery.
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