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The distinguished Pedro Lascuráin looked presidential. |
Pedro Lascuráin was in the office on February 19, 1913—the office
of President of Mexico. He dawdled
for about 45 minutes before departing. In the process he set the unchallenged world’s record for the shortest term in office by any national
president.
Lascuráin
was a distinguished looking gentleman,
a lawyer from one of the impeccable old families of Mexico. No drop
of mere Indio or Meztizo blood ran through his veins. Yet he was not, as you might imagine, an irredeemable
reactionary.
Born in 1856 and educated at the Escuela Nacional de Jurisprudencia he was mayor of Mexico
City in 1910 when he threw his support to
Francisco I.
Madero and his Anti-Reelectionist Party.
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Francico Madero, the short man in the center, led the Revolution then won the Presidency in fairly honest election, |
Madero opposed the sham re-election—for the sixth time—of long time President/dictator Porfirio Diaz. For his
trouble, Diaz had him arrested. But he escaped to the United States and from there launched the Mexican Revolution.
It was as if a great damn burst. All over Mexico peons and middle class reformers
alike rose up. Portions of the military,
reading the tea leaves, joined them. By
May 25, 1911 Diaz was forced to resign. Madero rose
to power first as caldillo de la revolución and was then elected as President by nearly 90% of the vote in what for
Mexico was a fairly honest election.
Madero tapped his fellow patrician Lascuráin as his Foreign Secretary.
The former Mayor was perfect for the striped
pants formality of the Diplomatic service.
His main job was to keep American
Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson placated.
It was assumed that Lascuráin’s respectability and obvious innate conservatism would
re-assure a skeptical Wilson
that the new government was moderate and responsible.
Alas Wilson listened more to American
business interests scared of the avowed leftism of many Revolutionary figures and to the promises of certain generals that if
allowed to come to power they would protect
those interests.
From the beginning despite his enormous personal
popularity, Madero was in trouble. His
policy of reconciliation,
including leaving many Diaz supporters in power and in control of Congress, angered radicals led by Emilio Zapata in the south and Pancho
Villa in Chihuahua. They were also upset by foot dragging on promised land reforms.
On the other hand reactionary
generals launched several rebellions. Madero came to rely on General Victoriano Huerta to put down rebellions like that of Pascual Orozco. That was
a mistake.
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General Victoriano Huerta--Madero's bad choice. |
Huerta and other generals were in contact with
Ambassador Wilson, who encouraged them to oust Madero
and promised that the U.S. Government would not
interfere in support of the constitutionally
elected government.
A clueless Madero recalled Huerta to the capital to take command of forces in the Federal District trusting him for support against
both more reactionaries and potential
leftist rebellions.
In February 1913 things came to a head when Huerta
with the support of two of the rebel generals previously disposed of, Bernardo Reyes, and Félix Díaz, Porfirio Díaz’s nephew, launched a coup d’
ėtat. After a few days of fighting,
on February 18 Huerta captured Madero
and Vice President José Maria Pino Suárez and held
them at the National Palace.
At the insistence of Wilson, Huerta, Reyes, and Díaz
met at the American Embassy. The
ambassador informed him that President
William Howard Taft had grown
squeamish about the coup and insisted that some
veneer of constitutionality had to be in place to save the administration from embarrassment.
All parties then signed el Pacto
de la Embajada (the Embassy Pact) promising a legal transfer of power and the safe conduct of
Madero and Suárez out of the country in
exchange for recognizing Huerta as the new President.
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The Mexican National Palace. |
Huerta then proceeded to the
National Palace. He had a plan. Under the Mexican Constitution of 1857, the Foreign Minister stood third in line for the presidency behind
the vice-president and attorney general. The attorney general was disposed of.
Lascuráin under what can be assumed was extreme duress, was then sworn in as
President. He had time for just two official acts.
The first was to appoint
Huerta Interior Minister—the next
officer in the line of succession. The
second was to write out his resignation as
President, making Huerta his legal successor.
The whole process took about 45 minutes—some say less.
Lascuráin was politely
shown the door and departed alive
and not under arrest. On the way out he declined Huerta’s offer for a high post in the new government.
Huerta’s troops surrounded the national Congress which
later that night rubber-stamped the
charade. Huerta was officially president.
Four days later a contingent of Ruarles—paramilitary
police and not part of the Mexican Army, took Madero
and Suárez from prison and riddled them full of bullet holes, claiming that they were attempting to escaped. The thin cover of the
troops not being under Huerta’s direct command and patently unbelievable story aroused international
condemnation.
The Mexicans call the whole
affair la Decena Tragica—the Ten Tragic Days.
In Washington incoming
President Woodrow
Wilson was not amused. He recalled the other Wilson—the conspiratorial ambassador. Relations with the Huerta
government steadily
deteriorated with reports of his routine brutality and his refusal
to step down and allow democratic elections. After a minor dust up
between Huerta forces in the port of Tampico, which
was being besieged
by revolutionaries, and sailors from the
U.S. Navy Squadron stationed
off shore to protect oil interests, Wilson
ordered the Navy and Marines
to occupy the city.
Meanwhile Huerta enemies, north
and south, gained
ground and inflicted loss after loss on his
army. On July 15, 1915 he was forced to resign and flee the
country.
In exile Huerta would continue to
plot a comeback. He found support in the German Embassy in the U.S. which offered him arms and support in the
hope that a hot war on America’s southern border would
keep the US out of World
War I. The plot
was easily
discovered.
Huerta was arrested and later died of cirrhosis of the liver in an American prison.
As for the hapless Lascuráin, he was reviled by many
for his reluctant part in Madero’s ouster and death. He retired from
public life and resumed the practice of law.
Later he served for 17 years as the president of a
small, conservative law school in the capital.
He died in relative obscurity on July
21, 1952 at the age of 92.
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