The glorious charge of the German cavalry at Haelen, Belgium as portrayed in propaganda for the folks back home.
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It
should have been a perfectly splendid
affray at the onset of what all sides seemed to think would be a glorious war providing for noble spectacle and opportunities for gallantry and honors sadly missing from Europe
for generations. The Great War was all shiny and new and
all of the powers leaping madly into
the melee were sure of rapid victory and Christmas at home. And what
could be a more fitting opening chapter than a clash between the dashing cavalry of two opposing armies, each still fitted out
in splendor as if for a victory parade down a broad avenue. It happened near a river ford town named Haelen in Belgium on August 12,
1914 just 105 years ago.
Thing had moved
briskly in Europe since the assassination of an Austrian Archduke in
his comic opera uniform and his wife in Sarajevo on June. July was wasted on a complicated series of threats, ultimatums, and rejections
that spread complex patterns to countries far removed from the original
clauses. On July 28 Austria-Hungary finally declared war on Serbia and three days later Germany
declared war on Russia for mobilizing to intervene on behalf of
its ally and client state Serbia. The
three great Central and Eastern European empires were now
committed, but the contagion could
not be confined.
On August 2 Germany invaded
Luxembourg, obviously intending to
move on Russian ally France. The next Belgian government
refused a German ultimatum to open its
borders to the passage of German troops and Britain government guaranteed military support to Belgium should
Germany invade. Contemptuously ignoring the warning Germany immediately entered
Belgium and formally declared war on France, the British government ordered
general mobilization and Italy declared
neutrality. The British mobilized and sent another
ultimatum to Germany then quickly declared war on Germany at midnight on August 4 Central
European time. The Belgium declaration of war was a final formality as the German army moved on Liège.
The
problem was that the huge armies of
the major powers, each calling millions of men to arms, dwarfed anything before
it in both complexity and the relatively short periods of time available to mobilize.
The notoriously efficient Germans with their highly trained, professional army and largely Prussian General Staff and senior officer corps were able to get
their large army on the move more quickly than France, which was still
scrambling, and Britain which had to move an expeditionary force from the home
islands.
But
even the Germans, like everyone else, were rusty.
They had not been in major combat
since the Franco-Prussian War in
1870. Only a handful of the most decrepit senior generals had even been lieutenants in that conflict. The French, who were mad to revenge their humiliating defeat in 1870, had fought rebellions in their North African possessions but had
mostly used their mercenary Foreign
Legion troops who by law could not serve on French soil. The British had been very busy with a
seemingly endless succession of colonial
wars in India, the Sudan, Afghanistan, and of course the Boer Wars in South Africa. They had many combat seasoned officers and highly professional regiments in
addition to reasonably trained reserves—and,
of course, unchallenged world naval
superiority. But naval superiority
would not immediately mean much in a land war in Europe and the British had not
engaged a modern European army since the Crimean
War which had ended way back in 1856.
And that had gone very badly for the British whose troops were poorly
equipped, clothed, and supported and who were pounded in a relentless and
brutal trench warfare campaign which
should have been taken as lesson,
but was, instead treated as an aberration.
These
armies had modern weapons—bolt action rifles that gave individual
soldier and units many times the firepower
of their Napoleonic Era
counterparts, machine guns whose
death dealing capabilities had not yet been fully understood as rendering old
fashion mass maneuver and the gallant charge obsolete, light-weight
and mobile mortars that could move
and advance with infantry, and breach-loading and rifled cannon that could heave explosive
shells far beyond the range of smooth
bore cannon with greater accuracy.
But
they still moved by horse power. No
European army yet had more than a relative handful of trucks. Civilian automobiles
were in use as staff cars and a few
were being tried out for scout vehicles,
but since they could not operate
reliably off roads were of
limited use. Motorcycles competed with bicycles
and horses as messengers where telephone lines were down or unavailable. The Germans were using some
limited radio communications as
well, but the equipment was too bulky to accompany units in the field. While in the mobilization phase, internal railway systems could deliver men and materiel to marshalling
points, but after that—and certainly after entering enemy territory—artillery, ammunition, and baggage
was all horse-drawn greatly
limiting the speed with which any army could advance even under ideal
conditions with little or no armed opposition.
So,
despite light opposition by the Belgians who were scrambling to get their small
army in place and hopping for the early arrival of the French and English in
large numbers, the Germans were not exactly slicing through the small country at lightning speed. You are
thinking of the highly mechanized Panzer
Divisions that enabled the Blitzkrieg of the next war. The Germans were plodding to Liège slowly and behind the detailed plans
of the General Staff.
German Cavalry on the move early in the war. These are Hussars--note
the distinctive jackets worn draped over the left shoulder, the hallmark
of this kind of cavalry.
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Which
is where the cavalry came in. All of the
European armies still carried large forces of cavalry, many still carrying lances for use against tightly packed
infantry formations. All of these forces
were now also armed with rifles, carbines,
and horse pistols. They were to be used as cavalry had been
deployed for centuries—for scouting and
reconnaissance, for screening the flanks infantry to prevent ambushes
or surprise attacks, for rapid movements ahead of the main army to seize strategic points like cross-roads and river fords, to harass
the enemy rear and disrupt baggage trains, over-run artillery positions, and
finally in pitched battle as shock
troops to shatter enemy infantry formations. In the course of such operations it was to be
expected that cavalry of opposing sides would discover each other resulting in
that most glorious of all actions, a mounted
cavalry battle with the blare of
bugles, charges and counter charges,
sabers slashing.
Like
many units of most armies, the Cavalry was still outfitted in the splendor
befitting old Napoleonic glory, or
an only moderately subdued version of it.
Even infantry was not immune—the French Poilus marched to war in bright blue coats, red trousers, and kepis. The Germans already preferred their gray
uniforms, but many troops still wore patent
leather spike helmets. Only the
British who had learned from bitter experience in all of their colonial wars
that their traditions scarlet coats only
made their troops easy targets, had adapted to dun brown woolens and a variety of soft caps and hats to provide
regiments with distinctiveness. But the
cavalry, the glorious cavalry, were still in their gleaming silver helmets, or some other elaborate headdress, knee-high
polished boots with spurs, cut-away
jackets with split tails or waist-length tunics, gauntlets, and scabbered sabers still cut dashing
figures. Uniforms, including the colors of coats and breeches, might vary between types of
horsemen—Hussars (light cavalry), Dragoons (multi-purpose assault and reconnaissance, frequently used as mounted infantry to fight on foot), Lancers (assault against infantry and artillery), and Cuirassiers (heavy cavalry with rifles
or carbines and assault troops)—and between regiments.
Representative uniforms of Belgian cavalry units in World War I. Some
of those at Haelen also wore silver helmets, but few got to fight
from the saddle.
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The
German generals decided to deploy their gaily bedecked cavalry—they had two whole
divisions organized as the II Cavalry Corps under General Georg von der Marwitz. Cavalry scouts sent ahead to reconnoiter
along the routes to Antwerp, Brussels and Charleroi reported on August 7 a gap in the Allied line between Deist and Hay.
Belgian lancers on scout duty.
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On August 11 Belgian cavalry scouts reported a large movement
of troops, including infantry, cavalry, and artillery were rumbling on the
move. Anticipating an attempt to breach
the gap before more French reinforcements could arrive, the Belgian cavalry
division under Lieutenant-General Léon de Witte was dispatched to secure the bridge over the River
Gete at Haelen and either block
the German advance or delay it long enough for the gap in the line to be
filled. De Witte was also pointedly
ordered to use his cavalrymen as infantry and not to challenge the Germans on
horseback.
Those
are disappointing orders for any
cavalry commander, but de Witte complied speedily. His mounted forces could move quickly to
Haelen and had time to take up defensive
positions with excellent cover. His
force consisted of five mounted regiments with 2,400 men, a bicycle company with 450 riflemen, and
one company of pioneers (armed engineers). He concentrated his forces at the rear of the
village and spread some along concealed
positions on his flanks should he be overwhelmed.
Also
on the 11, the German 2nd Cavalry Division under Major-General von Krane was ordered ahead towards Spalbeek and the 4th
Cavalry Division under Lieutenant-General
von Garnier was to advance via Alken to Stevoort. But neither force moved until August 12
because their horses and men were exhausted from a forced march in intense summer heat and sufficient oats for the horses had not caught up
to them.
Before they could move, however, the Belgians intercepted an encoded radio message that revealed the
German force and its destinations—one of the first such instances in modern war
and a red-flag warning to secure messages floating in the airways
for anyone to pick up. Belgian
headquarters quickly dispatched the 4th
Infantry Brigade to reinforce de Witte at Haelen
Germans from the 4th Division attempted to cross the Gete
behind a screen provided by members of two Jäger battalions (literally hunters but elite specialized ranger units used as advanced skirmishers often in conjunction with
the cavalry.) The movement was detected
and 200 advanced Belgian skirmishers set up defensive positions in the building
of the town inflicting a whiting fire on the attackers. Belgian pioneers blew the bridge but it failed to completely collapse. German artillery rousted the defenders from
the village sending them back across the river.
Von Krane managed to get about 1000 of his
mounted troopers across the bridge and into the town. He must have been confident that he could scatter an inferior enemy. He was
wrong. There was soon hell to pay.
The main Belgian line stretched west from the
town and was hidden behind copses,
hedges, and farm building. Attacks there were repulsed because the
attackers could not, in most cases even see the defenders or make out how they
had deployed their line making traps likely.
Haelen and to the south the Jägers and the 17th and 3rd Brigades of
the 4th Division tried to advance through some corn fields. Here they met disaster despite support from artillery
and from a machine gun company. The dismounted Belgians poured vicious
fire into repeated charges by the cavalry, cutting the advance units to pieces
as men and horses got tangled in barbed
wire farm fences and floundered in a sunken
road where they were picked off by sharpshooters
and raked with machine gun fire.
The grim aftermath of the battle.
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At the end of a long
afternoon of sharp fighting the German retreated, the battered 4th Division
toward Alken and the 2nd Division
toward Hasselt. It was a stunning victory for the plucky and
outnumbered Belgians and a devastating loss of pride and prestige for the
German cavalry. Both sides sustained
heavy casualties—the Belgians lost 160 dead and 320 wounded and the Germans
lost 150 dead, 600 wounded, 200–300 prisoners. The 4th Division alone lost a combined 501 men dead and wounded and 848
horses—casualty rates of 16% for men and 28% for horses. That far exceeds the classical definition of decimation.
Far from expected glory, the German cavalry was given a grim preview of the relentless war
ahead.
Despite the valiant stand, which is still celebrated by the Belgians if forgotten
by everyone else, the action at Haelen barely slowed up the German advance
across the country. Germans
besieged and captured fortified Namur, Liège, and Antwerp and were not stopped until the Allies could mass
enough troops along the Yser in late
October of 1914 leaving the Germans in control of most of Belgium. Then the war began to settle down into the
grinding years of trench warfare so etched in the popular memory.
All that's left of glory--a gleaming helmet of a member of the German 2nd Cuirassiers found on the field of battle.
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At home German propagandists turned the defeat of the Cavalry
at Haelen as a gallant but futile loss, much as the English had romanticized the doomed Charge of the Light Brigade in the
Crimea and the Americans had lionized
Custer and the 7th Cavalry after
the Little Big Horn. Allied propagandists made hay of the Rape of Belgium by the inhuman Huns, and their German counterparts
vowed vengeance for the slaughter of their Knights in the Silver Helmets.
Such is the way of war.
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