Boston Police leave a meeting after voting to strike. Note how young most of the officers were, many veterans of the Great War and with young families. |
Those who do not
learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
And here is a bit of history that is very instructive of the present moment
when Republican/Tea Party governors
gleefully make war on unionized public employees, try to strip Democratic big city administrations of
their power and authority, and make open warfare on despised ethnic
minorities. These governors have
sometimes, like Scott Walker in Wisconsin, tried to split police from other unionized public
employees by execmpting them from some of the worst of the outrages. After all, authoritarians need their agents
of official repression. But other
governors have not even bothered and lately the Republican presidential
candidate has publicly disdained spending tax payer money on “police and
teachers.” It is not impossible to image
a replay of the sorry events chronicled below.
Read on.
On
September 9, 1919 more than 1000 members of the Boston Police Force went out on strike to demand recognition of
their newly charted union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor (AFL). That was more than 72% of the officers and
men of the force, including the overwhelming majority of rank and file
patrolmen. They set off a firestorm that
would end with their union smashed, all of their number fired and banned from
re-employment for life, the dreams of respectability and cooperation of the
leading labor conservative dashed, and a flinty, taciturn Yankee governor catapulted to national prominence.
In
many ways the strike had its origins in the always tense relations between the
lofty Protestant Brahmins who had once
dominated the city with noblesse oblige and the ever growing mass of
largely Catholic and Irish immigrants and their decedents
clamoring for their place in the sun.
The Brahmin class ruled, with minor and rare interruptions for the
fugitive Democrat or Know Nothing, since the first mayor
under a city government charter in 1822.
They changed party labels with the times from Federalist to Whig to Republican, but they were always the
same party, united against the Popish
menace since immigrants from the Auld
Sod began pouring into the city in the 1830s.
But by the 1870’s political
control of the city hung in the balance.
Mayors switched regularly between Republicans and Democrats. At first the Democrats were simply WASP “class traitors.” But Irish born Hugh O’Brien shocked the blue bloods by winning in 1885. And after 1902, with one brief exception,
Irish Democrats, including twice each John
F. “Honey Fitz” Fitzgerald and machine master James M. Curry, held the mayoralty and a solid majority of the City Council. The Brahmins had lost control of the city
never to regain it.
But they were not the sort of
people to give up easily. For nearly
twenty years they made war on Democratic
city administrations via their continuing iron grasp on the State House. There were many battle grounds as
governors and legislatures sought to strip authority away from the city
piecemeal. But control of the large
Police Department was the main battle ground.
The department had become almost exclusively Irish. From the point of view of Republicans in the
state house the department was a cesspool of patronage. Democratic mayors, naturally, believed
control of the police was a natural part of city administration.
As early as 1895, reading the
demographic writing on the wall, the state stripped the mayor of direct
authority over the police by creating a five member Board of Commissioners appointed by the governor. In 1906
Republican Governor Curtis Guild, Jr. decided to bring the police more directly under his control. The Board was replaced by a single Police
Commissioner appointed for a six year term and answerable to the Governor.
But just because the state had
usurped command authority over the local police, did not mean that it was
assuming the cost of the force. The city
was still responsible for the pay, equipment, and maintenance of police
stations out of its tax revenues—and the legislature put severe limits on how
the city could raise and levy taxes.
Under the circumstances Democratic mayors had little incentive to keep
pay competitive and stations in repair.
Conditions for patrolmen had
been deteriorating for years. And sharp
inflation associated with World War I deeply eroded the value of pay
packets. Since 1913 the cost of living had risen 76%, while pay
increased only18%. Officers were not paid for required court appearances and
were expected to provide their own uniforms and equipment, including the
pistols they carried in their pockets.
Work days were 10 hours and the men were often required
to sleep overnight at stations without
pay in case they were needed. The work
week was typically between 75 and 90 hours a week and conditions in the
stations, which lacked basic sanitation, were appalling. Under
the circumstances it was understandable that officers sought to improve their
condition.
At first they sought to transform the Boston Social Club, an organization
formed by the Department itself in 1906, the year a single commissioner to
control of the force. After officers
watched Boston Firefighters win a major
pay raise by threatening to resign in mass in August of 1918, the pressed the
Commissioner to open negotiations through the Social Club.
In 1919 Governor Calvin
Coolidge appointed a new, tough minded Commissioner, Edwin U. Curtis. The
Commissioner refused to negotiate with the Social Club and unilaterally imposed
his own sham grievance procedure. Seeing
they were getting nowhere, members of the Social Club voted overwhelming to
seek a charter for a local union from the AFL.
Curtis responded on August 11 with a sweeping General Order forbidding police officers to join any “organization,
club or body outside the department” exception only “patriotic organizations”
such as newly minted the American Legion
which had the explicit approval of the commissioners. Officers pointed out that the order was so
broad that it not only outlawed belonging to a union but also many ordinary
fraternal organizations, sporting clubs, or the popular local Democratic Clubs.
Four days later the Social Club received its AFL charter
and on August it was formally welcomed into the Boston Central Labor Union, which also expressed strong support for
the new union and condemned the high handed tactics of Commissioner
Curtis. The new union appointed an eight
member committee to seek a meeting with Curtis to open negotiations.
Curtis not only refused to meet with the men, he
suspended all of them and 11 officers of the local union pending disciplinary
board action for insubordination. His
actions were wildly applauded in the local press. The union dug in hits heels and a crisis
loomed.
Democratic Mayor
Andrew James Peters, the first non-Irishman since 1902 but politically
beholden to the loyal mass of Irish voters who had elected him, attempted to
calm the situation with the appointment of a Citizens Commission to investigate complaints by police officers
and plead with Curtis for restraint.
Committee Chairman James J.
Storrow, a prominent reformer with connections to the establishment,
recommended that Curtis recognize a union un-affiliated with the AFL and renounce
the use of the strike. In return the
Commissioner would re-instate the suspended officers and open negociations. The plan received the endorsement of four out
of five Boston daily newspapers and even the local Chamber of Commerce. But
Curtis, with the encouragement of Governor Coolidge, remained unmoved.
Department trials began on September 8 and the members of
the bargaining committee were, as predicted, found guilty. The union responded with a strike vote of
1134 to 2 and scheduled the walk out for the next day. Curtis threatened
to fire all strikers and express confidence that most would show up for work.
They didn’t. The
strike began effectively at 5:45 PM. The
city was left with a skeleton force of sergeants and officers. Governor Coolidge ordered 100 Metropolitan Park Police Department officers
under his control to take the place of the strikers, but 58 of them refused and
were immediately placed on suspension pending dismissal.
That night was marked by street disturbances,
particularly in South Boston, the
Irish neighborhood where most of the strikers lived. Mostly it was rowdies throwing stones at
street cars and over turning push carts and general hooliganism. Professional gamblers, prostitutes, and bootleggers
emerged from the shadows to openly and defiantly ply their trades on the
speech. But later research showed that
despite hysterical press claims, major crimes such as armed robbery and
burglary were committed at no greater pace than a comparable period with police
protection. The next morning all five Boston daily ran screaming headlines
portraying the city as under siege by criminals. Lurid stories were told, many of them
outright fabrications, others wild exaggerations.
That morning Mayor Peters formally asked the Governor for
state troops to enforce the peace. He had held off all night in hops that
Commissioner Curtis would make the call and relieve him of the politically
dangerous onus of calling out troops against his own ethnic and labor constituents. Which is exactly what Coolidge wanted. Coolidge agreed and eventually dispatched
more than 5000 members of the State Guard, mostly called up from small towns in
western Massachusetts and the wealthier suburbs of the city, and included a
unit of Harvard Students, many of them scions of the Brahmin class.
The newspapers were lambasting the strikers as traitors
and deserters. Soon they were upping the
ante by accusing them of being Bolsheviks
and revolutionaries. Wire services picked up the most lurid
tales of looting and crime spreading them—and outrage—across the country.
The Guard assumed control of the streets on the night of
September 10. They were inexperienced,
poorly trained, and sometimes frightened.
The Guard was quick to use lethal force against street assembly. It opened fire on a crowd of civilians in
South Boston killing at least 4 outright and wounding many. Others around the city were shot, bayoneted
or clubbed with rifle butts. Sporadic
disturbances continued though the night of September 12. Each day the rhetoric from Curtis, Coolidge,
and the press grew more heated and pictures of a reign of terror were painted
in the press.
A mass meeting of Boston officers on the 11th scolded
Coolidge for his harsh charges of desertion and treason noting that many
members of the force had served honorably and bravely in war and pointedly
noting the Coolidge had not.
The night of the 11th the Central Labor Council, sensing
public hostility, declined to support a resolution calling for a General Strike in defense of their new
union brothers. Instead they issued a
bland call for arbitration. The police
union was shocked by the apparent desertion of their new allies when they most
needed them.
Returning from a trip to Europe the AFL’s longtime chief, the conservative craft unionist Samuel L. Gompers, who had cooperated
with authorities in the persecution of Reds,
socialists, and anarchists and had opposed the radical Industrial Workers of the World at every hand, was shocked. He thought he and his “respectable” union
movement had officially been given a place at the table. He had won the plaudits of the President and
corporate bosses for his dedicated support of the War. He was the farthest thing in the world from a
radical or revolutionary, but here he was being denounced as if he was Eugene V. Debs himself.
Nor were the police officers radical men. Most were observant Catholics and extremely patriotic.
None of the leadership had ties to the Socialist Party or any other left wing organization. They were simply loyal Democrats. And on numerous occasions members of the
force had shown that they were willing to use their clubs on picket lines or
against radical meetings. They were as
bewildered as Gompers at the turn of events.
Gompers summoned up all of the prestige he thought he had
earned. On September 12 he wired President Woodrow Wilson and Governor
Coolidge, requesting that the suspended men be reinstated, and that the union
return to work pending the results of an arbitration panel. He followed with a
personal phone appeal to the governor. Coolidge responded to this moderate
request with a personal blast of Gompers and a public scolding that left the
AFL chief deeply humiliated. “There is
no right to strike against the public safety, anywhere, anytime,” Coolidge
scolded, and declared that he would continue to “defend the sovereignty of
Massachusetts.” Coolidge was catapulted
to the national fame that would lead him the Vice Presidency in 1920 and the White House upon the death of Warren
G. Harding.
Commissioner Curtis moved to replace all striking
officers from a pool unemployed veterans provided by the American Legion. They never got their jobs back, even when
Democrats finally took control of the State House in 1932 and revoked the
permanent ban. To add insult to injury the
replacement police force was granted substantially higher wages, provided with
uniforms and equipment, and station houses were upgraded with modern
facilities—all of the reforms sought by the banished men.
The scars of the strike are still felt today. The clannish alienation of Southie, still the home of Irish
Americans and immigrants alike and home to both strikers and victims of Guard
violence, can be traced to the strike. A
deep suspicion of the scab police who displaced their people helped foster the
culture that nurtured the notorious Irish gangs of strong arm and bank robbers,
burglars, and cartage thieves that have thrived there ever since. And some former policemen, unemployed and
blacklisted, joined those gangs.
The suppression of the strike was a last gasp of the
Brahmins and WASP dominance not only of Boston, but of the state, which is now
not only the most reliably Democratic, but among the most heavily Catholic in
the country.
Police and public unionism was set back generations. The thoroughly frightened, the AFL revoked
all of the charters for police unions that it had granted around the
county. Most states enacted laws making
strikes by police and other public employees a crime subject to jail
sentences. Police union finally began to
make a comeback in the 1950’s and public employee unionism has spread to every
level.
But today attacks on public unions are resuming in volume
and vehemence. Calls for breaking
existing unions and banning future ones are heard at Tea Parties around the
land. There is even nostalgia for Calvin
Coolidge.
No comments:
Post a Comment