File this one in the best-laid
schemes o’ mice an’ men gang aft agley department. The plan
was brilliant. Its execution nearly perfect down to the last detail. The result exactly as desired, until
mere mortal men marched into the breach.
By the summer of 1864 the grim carnage of the American Civil War had ground to a stalemate. Since Gettysburg
a year earlier Confederate General
Robert E. Lee and his legendary
Army of Northern Virginia
had been hard pressed by vastly superior Union forces
of the Army of the Potomac under
the direct command of Major
General George Meade directly
and personally supervised by Commanding
General Ulysses S Grant.
Once famous for his audacious and aggressive maneuvers,
Lee was forced to defend the Confederate capitol of
Richmond. He erected
impressive earthen work fortifications in a wide ring around the city. The old
man was proving to be just as adept at what would be the future in the Industrial Age—trench warfare.
The key to Richmond was
at the rail hub of Petersburg through which the city and
the army could remain supplied with food,
supplies, and munitions. Grant called it the “backdoor to Richmond” and proceeded to lay siege to the city and
The armies faced each other along a 20
mile front from the old Cold Harbor
battlefield near Richmond to areas south of Petersburg. An attempt to take the town by assault
ended in failure on June 15. Since then, the two armies had pounded each
other with artillery, peppered
the opposing lines with deadly fire from sharpshooters
and snipers, and delicately probed each other’s lines
with reconnaissance patrols. Both commanding generals were frustrated.
It took a mining engineer to come up with a solution to Grant’s problem—Lt. Col. Henry Pleasants, commanding
the 48th Pennsylvania Infantry of Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside’s IX Corps. His proposal
was simple on paper—dig a long mineshaft from the Union siege trenches then under Confederate outer defenses until
under the major fortification at the
center of the Rebel lines, Elliott’s Salient. Sappers would then plant and set off a huge mine which would
blow the fort away and open a breach through which Union
forces could pour, smashing the Confederate I Corps
and rolling up Petersburg before
Lee could muster his forces from elsewhere along the lines.
Burnside was a once promising commander nursing a badly bruised reputation. His indecision
as Army of the Potomac commander at
Fredericksburg in December of 1862
had thrown away the best chance for a quick end to the war and led to one of the bloodiest defeats the Army
was ever handed. Busted back to a Corps commander, his lack of
aggressiveness at Spotsylvania Court
House earlier that year had aggravated
Grant. Burnside was determined to prove that he was imaginative and aggressive. He quickly gave the go-ahead to
Pleasant’s plan. Up the chain of command Meade
and Grant also signed off on it but were not much convinced it would work.
Neither lent much logistical support to the effort.
Pleasants’ own troops, tough coal miners from the fields
of western Pennsylvania, were just
the men for the job. They were
maybe the only men in the Union army who would not consider the task
drudgery. In fact, for them digging in the soft Virginia soil must
have seemed like a cakewalk.
Digging began in June and proceeded
quickly. The men had to scrounge lumber to shore up the tunnel
and for the ingenious ventilation system
which sucked fresh air from the narrow
mine entrance all the way to
the face of the digging via a wooden duct. Fetid air at the end was heated by a constantly burning pit fire and vented out drawing the fresh air to fill the vacuum. This system avoided the use of multiple
air vents which could have been observed.
The miners dug by hand and removed the soil in wooden soap
and ammunition boxes drawn by rope along a crude wooden plank rail. On July 17
the shaft reached under Elliott’s Salient at a depth of about fifty feet. A perpendicular
gallery about 75 feet long extended in both directions.
All of this had been accomplished un-detected by the enemy. Confederate
intelligence reported rumors of the mine to Lee about two weeks
after construction began. He didn’t believe it. Finally, after receiving new report, he began desultory anti-mine efforts which failed to find or detect the shaft.
Confederate General John Pegram in charge
of the artillery in the sector
took the rumors more seriously, however, and on his own authority as
a precaution had trenches and gun
emplacements built to the rear of the Salient as a secondary
line of defense.
Meade and Grant finally decided to go all in on the plan. The
gallery underneath the Confederate position was filled with 8,000 pounds of
gunpowder in 320 kegs. The main chamber was extended to 20 feet below the fort and
was packed shut with 11 feet of earth in the side galleries
and 32 feet of packed earth in the main
gallery to prevent the explosion blasting out the mouth of the mine.
On July 27 Grant sent Major Generals Winfield Scott Hancock and
Phil Sheridan on a combined infantry/cavalry attack along
the James River southwest of
Richmond and miles from the Petersburg front.
In what became known as the First
Battle of Deep Bottom or New Market
Road the forces were repelled in two sharp days of
skirmishing around Fussell’s Mill and
Bailey’s Creek. Although Grant held out some hope that Hancock’s infantry could punch a hole in the defenses to allow Sheridan’s cavalry
to pour into Richmond or failing that ride around the city severing rail connections, he was not entirely disappointed when the
attacks were repulsed. They had succeeded in causing Lee to
send troops from Petersburg to re-enforce
the line along the James.
Grant turned his personal attention to the well-developed plans for the Petersburg
Weeks earlier at an officer’s call Burnside had acceded to the plea of former New York City dance master Brigadier
General Edward Ferrero to use his division
of United States Colored Troops
(USCT) as the leading assault unit.
Burnside, who originally had other plans, agreed. The division was fresh, well equipped, and most importantly at full strength, 4,200
men—a rarity when veteran units were often whittled away to half their original size or less through combat
loss, disease, and desertion. The division was given a rarity for the Civil War—two full weeks of specialized training and instructions for this
mission. After the mine went off, they were to move
ahead in the confusion of the enemy and secure the crest of the crater on either side to allow the rest of the Corps to pass along the rim or through the crater
When Meade reviewed the plans,
he fretted that the unit which Burnside considered fresh was simply green and therefore unreliable in combat, especially
in a critical role. He also worried that if the Colored Troops failed, they would discourage
commanders from accepting and fighting alongside of others. Although Colored Troops had proved themselves in other theaters, they were new to the elite Army of the Potomac. Grant agreed and ordered Burnside to revise the order of battle
less than 24 hours before the attack.
At another officer’s call Burnside
conducted a lottery among his three white divisions to select a
lead. Brigadier General James F. Ledlie of the 1st Division won the draw.
The Colored Division would join the two others in the second wave of the attack.
Ledlie returned to his unit but never issued the special instructions
for taking the flanking rim first. The men were told only that they would have
the honor of leading a full frontal
Meanwhile Col. Pleasants was deep
underground personally supervising the final placement of the explosives and making sure the
earthen plugs in the tunnel were strong.
The mine was supposed to be detonated at 3:30 in the morning of June 30. But the Army had provided inferior fuses. Two attempts
to light it failed. Finally, two volunteers crawled into the mine, found where the fuse had
burned out had broken, and spliced
a fresh fuse on the end. It was
after dawn when the mine finally blew up at 4:30, with enough light for Confederate pickets to recognize that there were large Union forces inside their lines.
The explosion itself went off
flawlessly. And impressively. The
fortifications of Elliott’s Salient were blown sky high killing most of the garrison. Despite a little
warning, the Confederate line was
thrown into the anticipated
confusion and panic.
Ledlie’s men at first seemed as stunned by the spectacle as the enemy. They paused to take in the scene and
had to be prodded forward by their officers and sergeants. Ledlie himself was nowhere to be found.
He was well to the rear, completely
out of line of sight of the battle in a bombproof bunker with Ferrero of the
Colored Division. Passing a bottle between them
the two officers were getting quietly drunk.
When the 1st Division reached the
crater instead of securing the rim, they charged directly into it. And at the bottom they stopped to gape at the destruction. The delays allowed time for Brig. Gen. William Mahone to cobble together a Confederate force to
rush to plug the breech. Rebs quickly occupied the vacant rim
and commenced a turkey shoot of the defenseless men in the crater. Troops madly
tried to scramble up the sides, but found the dirt gave way under them. They were trapped.
But they were not to be alone. Burnside, refusing to be charged once again with
indecision and lack of aggression, ordered the Colored Division forward to reinforce the trapped 1st. Denied the rim, they followed into the crater.
Their appearance enraged the Confederates who
intensified fire, including round after round of intense artillery fire.
Burnside ordered the Colored Division forward to reinforce the 1st. They also pushed into the Crater and were trapped. They were singled out by enraged Confederates and were nearly annihilated. No prisoners were taken from them. The wounded were shot or bayoneted. Only a handful escaped, mostly men who did not enter the crater.The turkey shoot continued for more than two hours. At one point some supporting troops did manage to flank the crater and advance inside the Confederate line taking trenches in brutal hand-to-hand combat. But there were not enough of them and could not be reinforced. After holding out for a short while they were cleaned out of the trenches by a counterattack.
As the battle wound down, Confederate troops summarily
executed Black soldiers trying to surrender. Fearing
retaliation by the Rebels, some White Union troops bayonetted the Blacks as
well. The Colored Division was virtually wiped out as an effective unit.
In all Union forces suffered 3,798
casualties including 504 killed, 1,881 wounded, and 1,413 missing or
captured. The Confederates lost
1,491—361 killed, 727 wounded, and 403 missing or captured.
Probably the best chance of the year at an early end to the war was thrown away. Grant reported to Army Chief of Staff Henry W. Halleck, “It was the saddest affair I have witnessed in this war…Such an opportunity for carrying
fortifications I have never seen and do not expect again to have.”
The finger pointing and blaming began immediately. A Court of Inquiry pinned the rap on Burnside, who was relieved of command and never entrusted with another. His reputation was ruined beyond repair. All of his division commanders were censured, especially Ledlie and Ferrero.
One of the few to come out of the
affair with an enhanced reputation
was Pleasants, whose troops were not
engaged in the actual fighting that day.
He was rewarded for his plan and execution with a brevet to Brigadier General.
At war’s end in 1865 the Congressional Joint Committee on the
Conduct of the War opened an inquiry into the debacle. Pleasants testified that if Burnside had been allowed to retain his original order of Battle, that the operation
would have been a success. Grant concurred. He wrote to the Commission:
General Burnside wanted to put his colored division in
front, and I believe if he had done so it would have been a success. Still I
agreed with General Meade as to his objections to that plan. General Meade said
that if we put the colored troops in front (we had only one division) and it
should prove a failure, it would then be said and very properly, that we were
shoving these people ahead to get killed because we did not care anything about
them. But that could not be said if we put white troops in front.
In the end, the commission agreed, laying the blame at Meade’s feet and
exonerating Burnside. Little good did
that do for the general’s already destroyed reputation.
On the Confederate side Mahone was hailed a hero and became one
of Lee’s most trusted division
commanders in the last year
of the war.
The Siege of Petersburg ground on for months more into a new year.
Union successes elsewhere, especially William
Tecumseh Sherman’s operations in the Deep South, were sealing the fate of the Confederacy. After Grant’s bloody Wilderness Campaign
offensive, Lee was finally forced
out of his trenches. Richmond fell. Lee surrendered. The South
But had the operation at the Crater gone as planned, maybe a million lives might have been saved.