The War of
1812 had been a disaster for American arms.
Cocky and nursing martial delusions, the fading
reality of the frightfully narrow victory in the Revolutionary War was replaced in the public mind with a myth
of an invincible citizen army. A cadre
of War Hawks had pushed a reluctant James Madison
to war. Led by the likes of the young Henry Clay, the War Hawks hoped to put an end to British support for marauding native tribes
on the frontier and to expand the new American Empire
by the capture of Canada while Britain was distracted
by Napoleon in Europe.
The pretext for
the war was the impressment of
American sailors at sea by the Royal Navy. But it was only a pretext. As outrageous
and irksome as the seizures may have been those most affected, New England merchants, sailors, and whalers, were adamantly opposed to
the war because of its disastrous
results for American trade.
But the War Hawks pressed on. The Regular
Army consisted only of a couple of regiments
of infantry scattered widely over frontier posts which hardly
ever came together to drill at even the company level and units of costal artillery posted to a string
of harbor forts. That didn’t
bother the Hawks. They believed that a brave armed yeomanry, the militias, and volunteers would be sufficient
to march on Montreal and York, the British capital. They were wrong.
America's first attempt at an invasion of Upper Canada across the Niagara frontier ended in disaster at the Battle of Queenstown Heights on October 13, 1812, the first major battle of the war. New York militia under Major General Stephen Van Rennselaer broke and ran from smaller British, Canadian militia, and Native forces under concentrated artillery and musket fire. Lieutenant Colonel Winfield Scott of the 2nd U.S. Artillery had command of the small number of Regulars on Queenstown Heights and was wounded and taken prisoner. On parole, he made his way to Washington to lobby for the creation of more regular infantry regiments.
Swaggering
Yanks did succeed in briefly occupying—and burning—York
early in the war but were soon sent reeling back across the border. Forts
Mackinac and Detroit fell and the garrison at Ft. Dearborn
(now Chicago) was massacred. In engagement
after engagement the barely
trained and ill equipped militia was put to rout, often fleeing at the first sound
of musketry or the flash of British bayonets. Tiny garrisons of
Army Regulars were easily overwhelmed. In upstate
New York, across the Ohio Valley,
and in the South the British armed and encouraged native allies who rampaged against isolated settlements. Despite American successes at sea and the eventual naval domination of Lakes Champlain, Ontario, and Erie,
British commanders had nothing but
well deserved contempt for American troops.
In 1814, buoyed by
naval success on the lakes, the Americans would try once again to invade Canada, this time across the Niagara
River near the Falls. The British knew it was coming. They
had re-enforced Canada with battle hardened veteran regiments with experience fighting Napoleon. In addition, they had large auxiliaries of Indian
allies, known to terrify the
Americans. Even their home grown militia was better drilled and
armed than their U.S. counterparts and had the added motivation of defending their homes.
They were sure that not only could they defend British North America, but that eventually they would be able to
slice through New York State and separate New England from the rest of the country. That region,
dominated by Federalists hostile to the Republican
administration, was already restive and threatening secession. It could be ripe for the picking.
But this time the Americans had something up their sleeves. Under the leadership of two young
career officers, Major General Jacob
Brown and brevet Brigadier General Winfield Scott, Congress and the War Department had finally been convinced to raise new regiments of regular
troops. Quietly they raised, and
more importantly disciplined, drilled,
and trained two new regiments, the 21st
and 25th Infantry, armed them with regulation military muskets tipped with glinting
bayonets and secured scarce mobile field artillery to support them. Unable
to secure regulation blue cloth, Scott outfitted his
regiment smartly in gray flannel and
made sure they had the tall shako caps with shining brass badges and a plume
that made the men feel as worthy as any European troops.
Under the over-all command
of Brown, the two officers divided their force. The main body, including the 21st and New York Militia crossed the river on
July 3, 1814, quickly captured Fort Erie,
and began to advance to the north. Two days later Scott in command of the 25th
made a surprise night crossing to
the north in an attempt to catch the
British in a classic pincher
maneuver.
Scott encountered a force of British regulars of about equal strength to his own at Chippewa. The aggressive
Scott lined his men up and attacked. They advanced
with perfect military precision.
When British artillery tore into the ranks and vollies of musket fire felled men by the score, the soldiers dressed ranks and continued to advance. The
astonished British commander exclaimed,
“Those are not the Tarrytown militia! Those are by God Regulars!” With bayonets lowered Scott put the veteran Redcoats to rout despite taking frightful losses of more than 300 men in his small force.
Pressing on, he rendezvoused
with Brown and together they continued to pursue the British. They captured Queenstown but extended
supply lines were harried by the local militia and Native auxiliaries forcing Brown to fall back to re-supply.
Meanwhile the British regrouped
under General Phineas Raill and advanced south occupying positions at Lundy’s
Lane. Lt. General Gordon Drumond arrived to take personal command. He ordered
an advance along the east bank
of the Niagara hoping to force Brown
back across the river. Instead
Brown turned around and confidently
began an advance against the British at Lundy Lane, an exposed position. Informed
of the advance, Raill ordered a withdrawal, but the order was countermanded by Drumond who also force marched additional troops to the
scene from Fort George to the north.
The British were still re-occupying
their positions when the
Americans attacked on July 25th. A brigade under Scott was badly mauled by British artillery. Yet
the 25th Infantry outflanked the
combined British and Canadian forces and sent them to flight. Raill was badly wounded and captured
by American dragoons. But the fighting had been fierce and Scott’s
forces had suffered heavy casualties.
The main body, regulars under Brigadier General Eleazer Wheelcock Ripley and New Your Volunteers drawn from the militia under Peter B. Porter, relieved Scott’s ravaged troops.
The relatively fresh 21st was
dispatched to capture the British guns.
After a devastating volley of
musketry and a bayonet charge, they did so. British reinforcements blundered into the Americans now occupying the heights
and were repelled with heavy losses.
Wounded, Drumond rallied his troops. Both sides attacked and counter attacked into the night, sometimes firing into their own troops
in the smoke and confusion of the
battle. By midnight both were exhausted
and fell back from the field.
The next day Brown ordered
a retreat to Fort Erie, destroying British fortifications as they went.
The British, too broken to pursue, fell back on
Queenstown to lick their wounds. Both sides had lost about 850 men in
the fighting. Only 700 Americans remained fit for duty, the British
had twice that.
Drumond would recoup to fight again. He lay
siege to Fort Erie but was defeated
with heavy casualties.
Even the hardened British regulars were horrified by the carnage at Lundy’s Lane.
The fighting was as fierce as anything they had seen in Europe and the casualty figures astronomical.
Drumond in his official report
noted, “Of so determined a Character were [the American] attacks
directed against our guns that our Artillery Men were bayonetted by the enemy
in the Act of loading, and the muzzles of the Enemy’s Guns were advanced within
a few Yards of ours”.
Historians would argue about the outcome of the Niagara campaign and Lundy’s Lane. Some would call it a draw. Others call it a pyrrhic American victory. Most settle that it was a narrow tactical win for the United States but a strategic
victory for Britain in that
it thwarted the American invasion of Canada. The events are enshrined in Canadian
history, where the battle is sometimes
called “our Gettysburg” because it was the high water mark of American aggressiveness and insured
that Canada would remain British.
On the other hand, in combination with American Naval
victories on the Lakes, the British were forced to abandon any hope of
invading the States from the north or sundering New England from
the rest of the country. And the memory of that grim fighting weighed heavily
on the minds of the British negotiators at peace talks in Ghent. Even the disastrous
defeat of the American militia at Blandensburg,
Maryland and Admiral Cockburn’s
subsequent burning of Washington just a few weeks after Lundy’s Lane could not erase British fears that eventually the Americans would be able to raise a real professional army and dominate the continent.
Lundy’s Lane goes a long
way in explaining what many
historians have regarded as the astonishingly
generous terms to which the British agreed at Ghent, essentially the reversion
to the status ante bellum of U.S. and Canadian borders. The British would even have to evacuate the wide swath of Maine that they had captured.
Few Americans know anything about the War of 1812.
Many of those who do assume that it was the American victory at New
Orleans garnered the
generous peace terms. But Andrew Jackson’s dramatic victory
happened after the Treaty of Ghent had already
been signed but before troops on either side could hear of it.
Most Americans have never
heard of the Niagara Campaign or the battles of Chippewa and Lundy
Lane. Even the War of 1812 itself is barely a historical footnote. The victory lives on in this country in
only two ways. The Cadets
Corps of the United States Military
Academy at West Point wear gray and don plumed shakos for dress parades in honor of Winfield Scott’s
Regulars.
And it has become
the by-word of all professional soldiers that only regular troops—not militias,
assemblages of short term volunteers or even hastily mustered National Guardsmen—are fit to stand up under concerted hostile fire.
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